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Abstract Comparative economics—the description and underlying explanation of
human and nonhuman variations on the relationship between life and its environ-
ment—seeks to discover how and to what extent the limitations that apply to some
living systems can be overcome in others, including our own economy. It is founded on
four phenomena, which collectively explain how life and its economic structures arise,
how diversity of form and function come about, and how change occurs. These phe-
nomena are self-organization, emergence (new properties and entities formed when
parts combine), selection and adaptation, and feedback between living things and
their surroundings. The systems of life vary in patterns of inheritance, the units among
which selection takes place, resources, and size; these variables, in turn, affect pat-
terns of history, adaptability, and innovation. Beneath the variation, all living systems
are subject to local competition, cooperation, and evolution. Ten distinctive insti-
tutions and capacities have been thought to be unique to modern humans: cultural
(non-genetic) inheritance of information and adaptations; cooperation among genet-
ically unrelated individuals; markets in which enforceable contracts determine the
quantities and prices of goods and services; utility, emergent goals and values informed
by stable preferences; intentionality, deliberate action toward a predetermined goal;
innovation by designing devices and institutions without historical precedents; sym-
bolic thought; extrasomal extension, work performed beyond internal metabolism;
and unsustainable exploitation of resources. These traits and capacities, which con-
fer unprecedented power and reach, occur widely outside the human realm and have
evolved independently in many organisms and ecosystems. They accelerate but do
not fundamentally alter adaptation and innovation, and reduce but do not eliminate
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the constraints under which life in a finite world has persisted for three and a half
billion years. Future civilization on Earth is therefore unlikely to forge an entirely new
world order. Policies and predictions that are inconsistent with these universal realities
are likely to fail. In particular: (1) local competition will remain necessary for suc-
cessful adaptation and innovation; (2) an information-based economy will not replace
an energy-based one, and energy use is unlikely to decline; and (3) redundancy of
production in multiple sites must not be sacrificed through free trade and elimination
of subsidies to achieve greater economic efficiency. Human survival requires that we
work with nature, not against it.
Keywords Human economy · Evolution · Emergence · Intentionality · Market
JEL Classification O1 · Q2 · Q57
1 Introduction
For centuries, an often tense intellectual exchange has been carried out about the place
of humans and their economy in the realm of life. Some participants maintain that
we are inextricably part of the biosphere, and that we and our civilization cannot
escape the laws of life. Others hold that human uniqueness is so far-reaching that the
principles by which the rest of the biosphere operates no longer apply to us.
If we are to place the modern human economy in the broader context of the
economies of life, we need to know which aspects of a given economy are partic-
ular, or unique, and which ones are broadly applicable to all economies. In short, we
need what I call comparative economics, the description and underlying explanation
of human and nonhuman variations on the relationship between life and its living and
nonliving environment. Living things including humans originate, grow, and change
in accordance with economic and evolutionary principles that operate at every scale of
inclusion from molecules to organisms, societies, and ecosystems, with humans and
the modern human economy representing one extreme variation on a common theme
of metabolizing life (Vermeij 1999, 2004, 2006; Corning 2005). Predictable patterns
and pathways of adaptation are discernible, subject to constraints and opportunities
that themselves vary in space and time. Entities that achieve greater power through
competition and cooperation and higher metabolic rates disproportionately influence
the distributions, adaptations, and interactions of less powerful life-forms, and there-
fore drive living systems (that is, economies of life) in directions of greater power and
reach (Vermeij 2004).
Many philosophers, scientists, and policy-makers continue to insist that humans
have advanced morally, intellectually, and technologically to the point of fashioning
an entirely new world order. Not only are humans unique, but so are other life-forms,
historical pathways, and environments. Keller (2007, p. 603) speaks for many with this
viewpoint when she writes, ‘By its very nature, life is both contingent and particular,
each organism the product of eons of tinkering, of building on what had accumulated
over the course of a particular evolutionary trajectory.’ In this view, organisms and the
lineages they represent are like individual molecules subject to Brownian motion in a
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liquid or gas. Each molecule traces a unique path, which cannot be predicted even if
motions and collisions accord with established physical principles. In Popper’s (1964,
p. 108) words, ‘the evolution of life on earth, or of human society, is an unique histor-
ical process.…Its description…is not a law, but only a singular historical statement.’
For him and others (Monod 1971; Gould 2002; Corning 2005), the particulars of time,
place, entities, and interactions preclude any coherent theory of history. The many
unique features of humans and our civilization would, according to this perspective,
make the pursuit of a unified theory even more of a lost cause.
My aim in this essay is to explore purportedly unique features of the modern human
economy in the broad context of the economies of nonhuman life. Economies of life
behave in predictable ways, even if their particular manifestations and the events that
influence their members are unique, in the way that particles undergoing Brownian
motion in a liquid are. Despite our many unique capacities and institutions, we humans
conform to the laws of living nature. We cannot overcome the limitations set by metab-
olism in a finite world unless we expand our control to other worlds not yet inhabited
by life as we know it on Earth. I begin, in Sect. 2, by outlining the four principles that
in my view underlie the evolution and economics of life. I then, in Sect. 3, explore
the wide diversity of economic relationships in living systems, the main point being
that the modern economy is an extreme variation that nevertheless has much in com-
mon with other, nonhuman economies. In Sect. 4 on purportedly unique features of
human-economic systems, I argue that few if any of these institutions or capacities
are found exclusively in the human realm of economic life. In Sect. 5, I point to the
harmful consequences of isolating the human-economic realm from the lessons of the
rest of living nature. Finally, in Sect. 6, I provide some concluding remarks.
2 Four fundamental phenomena
Four interrelated phenomena collectively describe and explain how complex life and
its economic structures arise and change. These are: (1) self-organization—nonliv-
ing particles spontaneously move and interact in predictable ways to create ordered
states according to the properties of the particles and their surrounding medium;
(2) emergence and synergy—parts act together and combine to form wholes whose
properties, interactions, and effects differ from those of their components; (3) selection
and adaptation—living entities competing for locally scarce resources to survive are
sorted according to criteria of performance set by living and nonliving sectors of the
environment; and (4) feedback—life modifies its living and nonliving surroundings,
which in turn modify the performance criteria for survival. Together these four phe-
nomena encompass a theory of economic history applicable to all systems consisting
of interacting, metabolizing entities. To set the stage for the remainder of the essay,
I discuss each phenomenon briefly below.
2.1 Self-organization
Life itself, and some of its molecular architecture, likely arose through self-organiza-
tion, the establishment of ordered patterns of lifeless particles according to the physical
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and chemical properties of these particles and their surrounding medium. Mass, charge,
temperature, gravity, viscosity, pressure, forces imposed by flow, and chemical concen-
tration gradients affect the shape and stability of molecules and some simple chemical
networks (Thompson 1942; Denny 1993; Corning 2005). More or less unambiguous
examples of self-organization include the formation of protocells (Nisbet and Sleep
2001; Martin and Russell 2003; de Duve 2005; Chen 2006) and the arrangement of
minerals and proteins in skeletal tissues (Thompson 1942). Other purported exam-
ples combine self-organization with metabolic processes created by living things.
These include the movement and patterning of cells in developing embryos (Raff
1996; Carroll 2005); the locations and directions of growth of blood vessels, nerves,
bones, and shells (Seilacher 1991; Vermeij 2002; Turner 2006); and the transforma-
tion of homogeneous landscapes into an ecologically patchy environment through the
clustering of organisms and their metabolic activities (Rietkerk et al. 2004). Self-orga-
nization is widely credited for providing structure in cities (Krugman 1996) and the
free-market system of capitalism (Rothschild 1990), as well as many other structures in
the human economy (Ayres 1994; Foster 2005) and the universe generally (Kauffman
2000; Chaisson 2001).
Corning (2005) has justifiably criticized theorists for overemphasizing the role of
self-organization in evolution and economics. In his view and mine, the entities that
self-organize must be autonomous, and therefore interchangeable, which living things
and their metabolizing parts are not. Neurons, cells, blood vessels, cities, markets, and
other evolved structures that are said to self-organize have properties that have been
shaped by selective processes which differ from the forces acting on inert nonliving
particles. Living elements may construct wholes in accordance with such forces, but
both the parts and the processes in which they are engaged are emergent phenomena
with distinct functions in a living system.
2.2 Emergence and synergy
New properties, interactions, and effects emerge when two or more units (usually
of different kinds) work together to form larger wholes. This is what happens when
hydrogen and oxygen atoms combine to form water; when inorganic molecules com-
bine and establish metabolizing networks to give rise to life (Eigen 1992; Kauffman
2000); when amino acids, catalyzed by other molecules, link to form linear sequences
which in turn define proteins with complex three-dimensional structure; when cells
adhere, move, and interact according to genetic ‘instructions’ to create a develop-
ing animal; when musical tones are organized into chords, rhythms, melodies, and
entire compositions; when words are organized into sentences and stories; and when
organisms band together to create complex societies and ecosystems. Even such basic
notions as space, time, matter, and energy may emerge from interactions of strings or
some other elementary components (Greene 2004). Emergence and synergy are nec-
essary to create complexity at all scales of inclusion from the subatomic to the galactic
(Chaisson 2001, 2005; Corning 2005). The interactions among parts always produce
a vastly greater diversity of properties, structures, and effects than exists among the
building blocks themselves (Kauffman 2000).
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As Corning (2005) observes, wholes have properties that influence their parts. The
emergent phenomenon of function affects the fate not just of the wholes, but of their
parts. Emergence is therefore not just about parts interacting to fashion wholes, but
also about wholes affecting their constituents.
An emergent property to which Corning (2005) attaches great importance is
synergy, defined by him as “the combined (cooperative) effects that are produced
by two or more particles, elements, parts or organisms—effects that are not otherwise
attainable” (Corning 2005, p. 132). It is these effects that influence the behavior of
wholes and their parts.
2.3 Selection and adaptation
Living things vary among themselves, and not all of them are equally compatible with
their surroundings. Some emergent entities are more stable, more powerful, more
adaptable, or longer-lasting than others. This inequality in performance among living
entities is an expression of selection, a universal, undirected process of sorting accord-
ing to one or more criteria of performance. Living things metabolically convert incom-
ing energy into the work of life—maintenance, growth, and propagation—and compete
for locally scarce resources. Cooperation and other means of acquiring and retaining
resources become adaptive if they enable the emergent life-forms to persist longer or
to propagate more effectively than other entities. Adaptation—a better fit between life
and environment—thus emerges as a universal state of living systems.
Although the type and extent of adaptation depend on the particulars of the
selective regime, many (perhaps most) adaptive traits are beneficial under a wide
variety of circumstances. Examples include large body size, an immune system to
deal with pathogens, the ability to learn, toxicity, and armor, among many others.
These traits or adaptive syndromes are expected—and observed—to arise again and
again over the course of biological evolution (Conway Morris 2003; Vermeij 2006).
2.4 Feedback
Selection is often portrayed as a process in which entities are sorted according to
criteria of performance set by their environment. Critically, however, life also affects
its environment through metabolism. There is, in other words, a dynamic interaction
between life and its living and nonliving surroundings (Vermeij 1999, 2004). Feed-
back (or mutual modification) of living entities with other entities is observable in the
coordination among biochemical pathways within an organism (Kauffman 2000); the
cycling of materials by organisms among the atmosphere, crust, and ocean (Fischer
1984; Rosing et al. 2006); the formation and control of neural connections by neurons
in a nervous system (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005); the growth and pattern formation
of metabolizing organs composed of branching tubes (Ghabrial and Karsnow 2006);
price-setting in markets (Jacobs 2000); and escalation (or, in special cases, reciprocal
coevolution) between prey and predator, plant and pollinator, parasite and host, and
competing companies or nation-states (Vermeij 2004). The two-way effects of living
things and their surroundings are essential to the emergence and selection of workable,
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well-adapted wholes built of interacting components that combine in multiple ways
according to a few simple rules (Sterrer 1992; Vermeij 2004). They are thus basic to
all economic activity.
This formulation of the basis of economic systems and evolution differs somewhat
from conventional treatments. Whereas many evolutionary biologists view selection
as a creative process that reigns supreme among the mechanisms of evolution, I argue
that an adequate theory must account not only for which entities succeed and which
do not, but also for how those entities that undergo selection arise in the first place
(see also Vermeij 2004; Corning 2005; Turner 2006; Lynch 2007; Reid 2007). For
Fontana and Buss (1994, p. 761) note, ‘Selection cannot set in until there are entities
to select.’ Selection has a role in stabilizing and integrating functional entities; but
self-organization, emergence, and feedback are also necessary for the formation of
diverse living wholes.
2.5 The economy
The pathways and transformations of matter and energy in a living system describe that
system’s economy. Members of the economy compete, cooperate, produce, consume,
and trade. Competition and environmental heterogeneity—the latter often being the
product of the economy itself—create diversity (Smith 1776; Vermeij 2005).
Although the criteria for survival vary greatly in their particular manifestations, all
aspects of an economy are measurable in units of energy or power. Resources, bene-
fits, costs, investment, price, and money can be expressed in units of energy, which is
stored for later use of expended in biological or economic work. Rates of production or
consumption, ecological productivity (the rate of biomass production per unit time),
economic profit, metabolic rate, growth rate, and the rate of evolution are expressible
in units of power (Lotka 1922; Van Valen 1976; Brown 1995; Vermeij 2004). Eco-
nomic inequality among members is best expressed as a dimensionless ratio between
either the energy or the power of entities.
This dimensional approach to comparative economics will strike some as
simplistic. Although water, oil, and food are all commodities that can be expressed in
units of energy, they are not interchangeable. Energy and matter come in many forms,
not all of which are relevant to any given economy. Although I acknowledge this
diversity, I believe it is useful to think of commodities and processes in dimensional
terms, much as it is useful to apply to common dimensional framework to phenomena
in chemistry and physics.
2.6 The materialist perspective
This materialist conception contrasts with a worldview emphasizing thermodynamics
and information content of systems. Theorists who perceive evolution and economic
life as a struggle for information point to the genetic code—the linear sequence of
bases on RNA or DNA molecules that specify sequences of amino acids in proteins—
as the information-based means by which life propagates. They correctly point out that
metabolism enables life to exist in a state far from thermodynamic equilibrium and that
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work of metabolism creates an organizational or informational order (Kornacker 1968;
Morowitz 1968; Riedl 1978; Wiley and Brooks 1982; Brooks et al. 1989; Weber et al.
1989; Ayres 1994; Kauffman 2000; Chaisson 2001). Foster (2005, p. 368), for example,
asserts that culture ‘constitutes a form of organized complexity in shared knowledge,
absent at the chemical and biological level of enquiry.’ In the modern ‘knowledge
economy’ (Mokyr 2002), ‘knowledge…is both a means and an end’ (Hodgson 1999,
p. 262).
Although this approach is technically correct, I find it too far removed from the lives
of the entities among which emergence, selection, and feedback take place. Without
the material survival machine that is the living organism, information—whether it be
genetic, epigenetic, or cultural—is meaningless. The information that truly matters—
literally a matter of life and death, success and failure, prosperity and poverty—is
adaptation. As Sterrer (1992) and I see it, an adapted organism or system is a living
hypothesis of its environment, a hypothesis that is continually tested and modified by
selection and feedback according to circumstance.
3 Variations on a theme
The systems of life vary greatly in the phenomenology and realization of patterns of
inheritance, the units among which selection takes place, resources, and size. These
variables, in turn, affect patterns of history, adaptability, and innovation. Diversity
within and among systems arises because components can combine in multiple ways
and because the conditions under which life thrives vary according to the constraints
and opportunities to which living things are exposed (Vermeij 2004). Comparative
economics accounts for these variations and seeks criteria by which diverse systems
can be compared. Perhaps most importantly, its goal is to discover how and to what
extent the limitations that apply to some systems can be overcome in others, including
our own advanced economy.
3.1 Patterns of inheritance
Some systems, especially those prevailing on the early Earth, are downright unfa-
miliar to most contemporary observers. A growing consensus holds that the earliest
life-forms comprised a community of dispersed protocells—replicating molecules sur-
rounded by a membrane—whose chemical reactions are driven by external sources
of energy (Nisbet and Sleep 2001; Martin and Russell 2003; de Duve 2005; Chen
2006). The molecular sequences that specify the machinery of metabolism and that
allow innovations and adaptations to spread by selection were contained not in single
individuals, but collectively in the community of protocells (Woese 1998; Vetsigian
et al. 2006). Traits affecting survival and propagation were transmitted horizontally
through interactions between protocells and vertically by replication. Only when the
coding system became stable and essentially universal as a result of selection [or, to
use Arthur’s (1989) term, lock-in] did the familiar vertical transmission become the
dominant mode of inheritance (Woese 1998; Vetsigian et al. 2006).
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Although vertical inheritance is the norm in the evolution of ‘higher’ organisms—
plants, animals, and fungi—genes and nongenetic information also flow horizontally.
Viruses and bacteria aid in the lateral spread of genes among species, and in fact provide
the basis for much of the genetic engineering that characterizes modern biotechnol-
ogy. Sex, which involves a highly regulated recombination of genes between male and
female to produce offspring whose genetic makeup differs from that of either parent,
is a form of horizontal gene transfer within species. Hybridization between members
of separate species is widespread and often results in the formation of new species in
both plants and animals (Mallet 2007). Well-integrated symbioses of phylogenetically
distant component organisms have produced new organisms such as lichens, corals,
wood-digesting termites, nitrogen-fixing land plants, rooted vascular plants, and the
eukaryotic cell.
Adaptive evolutionary change can occur regardless of how traits are inherited and
modified (Mesoudi et al. 2004; Vermeij 2004). The different modes of inheritance do,
however, have important implications for history, adaptability, and innovation.
3.1.1 History
Evolution is typically portrayed as a process of tinkering: most modifications on estab-
lished themes appear through point mutations or other small genetic changes, and
accumulate through time, leaving a phylogenetic record as they do so. If it weren’t
for vertical transmission, we would be unable to piece together genealogies or trace
evolutionary lineages through time. The very notion of a lineage depends on vertical
transmission and therefore on evolutionary tinkering. Horizontal transmission wipes
away some of this history, and transforms the ideal of an evolutionary tree with open
branching into a more complex structure in which some of the branches form an inter-
connected network. In fact, as also noted by Doolittle and Bapteste (2007), the classic
tree of life is only one of several patterns that we observe in the history of life; networks
and webs, reflecting horizontal patterns of inheritance, occur alongside the branching
trees as classically conceived by Darwin (1859).
3.1.2 Adaptability
Vertically transmitted genetic adaptations tend to be well regulated and stably
expressed, but their rate of change is limited by generation time, the interval between
an entity’s birth and age of first reproduction. The speed and flexibility of adaptive
responses are faster when vertical inheritance is coupled with other mechanisms by
which traits spread. Experiments with sexual and asexual strains of yeast, for exam-
ple, show that sexual recombination speeds up the rate at which these fungi can adapt
(Goddard et al. 2005). Moreover, sex and the other mechanisms discussed above
produce a greater diversity available for selective agents to act on. The variety and
frequency of potentially life-altering circumstances that an individual confronts—fluc-
tuations in resources and weather, and enemies of all kinds—cannot be accommodated
by the genetic system without the generation of variety by other means. A vertically
inherited instructive and regulatory set of genes thus spawns a huge, flexible array
of neural, immunological, and epigenetic responses to meet spatially and temporally
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unpredictable variations in the environment (Frank 1996; Kirschner and Gerhart 1998,
2005; Carroll 2005).
Modifications in growth, shape, size, and behavior resulting from immediate
responses of an organism to its environment are met with everywhere in biology. In
multicellular organisms, the course of development from fertilized egg to adult incor-
porates a great deal of so-called epigenetic information, which comes about through
the interaction of structural genes and regulatory genes (Wilson et al. 1974; Raff 1996;
Newman and Müller 2001; Carroll 2005; Kirschner and Gerhart 2005). In fact, many
aspects of shape now under strong genetic control, such as the consistent right-handed-
ness of claws in some crab species and the right-handed shell coiling characteristic of
most snails, likely originated as nongenetic phenotypic reactions to factors in the envi-
ronment or the organism’s internal architecture. Regulation and stabilization of these
traits by genes through a process of genetic assimilation evolved because these initially
unregulated responses were consistently beneficial (Waddington 1962; Agrawal 2001;
Pigliucci 2001; Palmer 2004). Similar mechanisms are at work in initially nongenetic
behavioral traits. In many animal species, mates observing the mating of other mem-
bers of the same species may mimic the preferences of those mates, with the result
that patterns of preference become vertically transmitted. Song dialects in birds and
linguistic dialects in humans undergo a comparable transformation from horizontal to
vertical transmission (Danchin et al. 2004).
3.1.3 Innovation
Innovation in both the natural and human realms arises in most cases either nongeneti-
cally or through horizontal recombination of genetic elements from different lineages.
Lateral transfer between genetically distinct entities is responsible for almost all bio-
chemical innovations, including complex synthetic and metabolic pathways (Vetsigian
et al. 2006). Compound organisms consisting of symbiotic components from separate
lineages have emergent novel traits not possessed by any of the partners (Margulis
1991). Gene duplication, which may often originate from hybridization between spe-
cies (Mallet 2007), likewise has spawned many innovations by increasing degrees
of freedom and loosening constraints on directions of adaptation (Raff 1996; Carroll
2005; Kirschner and Gerhart 2005).
3.2 Units of selection
There is great diversity, both among and within economic systems, in the types of
entities that are subject to selection and in which adaptation can be said to be present.
In traditional conceptions of evolution, the individual organism is seen as the primary
unit of evolution and adaptation (Williams 1966; Leigh 1983; Corning 2005). The
criteria for entities as units of evolution—the ability to multiply, inheritance of traits,
and variation in these traits among individuals—do indeed qualify organisms as evolu-
tionary units (Maynard Smith 1991). These same criteria, however, also describe other
entities and systems, including coalitions, species, coherent societies, languages, cul-
tures, and even some ecosystems (Wilson 1974, 2002, 2003; Stanley 1975; Eldredge
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1985; Leigh and Rowell 1995; Sober and Wilson 1998; Gould 2002; Leigh and Vermeij
2002; Danchin et al. 2004; Mesoudi et al. 2004). An entity becomes individual-like,
and therefore subject to selection and adaptation, when the rate of change among its
components is less than the rate of sorting among like entities, that is, when the whole
is intact long enough not to dissolve into chaos (Kauffman 1993). Higher-order units of
biological evolution emerge when their self-interested components come under suffi-
cient regulation by the whole’s central authority to favor the community good over the
short-term selfish behavior of the living parts (Leigh 1983; Buss 1987). Ecosystems
composed of dispersed living things can be thought of as economically evolving units
in the sense that their emergent properties—diversity, resilience, primary productivity,
extent of facilitation, rates of consumption, and rates of recycling nutrients, among
others—become stable attributes that affect the systems’ persistence and replicability.
3.3 Resources
History reveals that, as increasingly inclusive entities become individual-like and as
new properties emerge, the list of potentially limiting resources expands (Vermeij
2004). For example, with the emergence of sexual recombination about 1.5 billion
years ago, the species became an evolutionarily significant unit, both in a phylogenetic
sense as a genetically independent branch on which gene exchange among organisms
maintains cohesive populations, and ecologically as a group of individuals construct-
ing and occupying a collective ‘niche’ comprising resources, habitats, ways of life,
allies, and enemies. Mates became a locally limiting resource for which females or
males could compete in those species in which internal fertilization evolved, spawn-
ing not only extraordinary bouts of sexual selection but also producing large numbers
of species (West-Eberhard 1983). Social organization in animals—usually an adapta-
tion to enhance competitive ability and to counter predators (Wilson and Hölldobler
2005)—enables individuals to compete for rare positions of high status (Rosen 2005).
Light became a meaningful resource only when photosynthesis arose. Nest sites safe
from predators were unnecessary before predators capable of consuming multicellular
animals evolved some 550 million years ago. Pollinators capable of moving among
dispersed plants became locally limiting resources when land plants evolved mecha-
nisms that no longer depended on wind or water to bring male and female gametes
together. Fossil fuel meant nothing to any organism until modern humans began to
use peat, coal, and petroleum. Businesses compete for customers, cities compete for
businesses. Ultimately, these emergent resources for which entities compete are new,
even if those resources are composed of components that were objects of selection for
less derived entities.
3.4 Size
Great diversity also exists among systems that differ in size. Expansive ecosystems
such as those on continents and in large bodies of water tend to support more species,
to be more productive, and to show greater degrees of escalation between species
and their enemies than do small systems on islands or in island-like habitats. Only
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large ecosystems can support large, metabolically active top predators and large, fast-
growing, competitively dominant plants (Vermeij 2004). Parallel variations occur in
human societies: small human groups support fewer occupations, less specialization,
and a less hierarchical structure than large ones (Diamond 1997) and, as in the natural
world, cannot take advantage of economies of scale. Comparisons between human and
nonhuman economies must therefore take size into account. In particular, the large
(indeed global) modern human economy should be compared to large present or past
ecosystems on continents and in oceans.
3.5 Summary of economic variation
Three points emerge from these comparisons. First, economic systems exhibit
variation in the mechanisms by which traits are introduced and propagated, in the
entities among which selective processes operate, and in the resources for which enti-
ties compete. Second, these variations coexist; some systems arose earlier than others,
but examples of all of them can be found in today’s biosphere. Third, the natural sys-
tems with which economists are most apt to compare the human economy are highly
derived, and represent a small fraction of the diversity of systems that have persisted
for eons. Comparisons between human and nonhuman economies should therefore
encompass a much greater range of the observed variation. Precise equivalents of
interactions, units, resources, information-transfer mechanisms, and other properties
will not always exist and should not be expected. Rather than looking in vain for such
precise correspondences, we should look for universal properties, determine whether
and how these added levels of complexity affect economic systems, and ascertain
whether, how, and to what extent our own highly modified economy violates the laws
of life.
4 Unique features of the human economy
Humans and the institutions they construct are distinctive in so many ways that they
are often thought to conform to rules radically different from the principles governing
the rest of living nature. Some of these traits pertain to the physical characteristics or
life-history of individuals: a large brain, very long pre-reproductive period of devel-
opment, long lifespan, upright posture, the ability to run long distances, a relatively
hairless skin, and deep insertion of the tongue in the oral cavity (Carey and Judge
2001; Aiello and Wells 2002; Kaplan and Robson 2002; Bramble and Lieberman
2004; Jablonski 2004). Although these traits cannot be separated from the economic,
social, and mental characteristics with which I am chiefly concerned, they will not be
explicitly treated here.
Other purportedly unique traits reflect social and mental capacities. I classify these,
somewhat arbitrarily, under 10 headings: (1) cultural transmission of information;
(2) cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals; (3) markets, where enforce-
able contracts between traders determine the quantities and prices of goods and ser-
vices; (4) utility, emergent goals and values in life, such as wealth and happiness,
informed by stable preferences; (5) intentionality, the directed, deliberate actions
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toward a predetermined outcome; (6) innovation by designing devices and institu-
tions without historical precedents; (7) symbolic thought, intimately connected with
language and the development of rules governing economic and social institutions; (8)
declining birth rates in modern societies; (9) extrasomal extension, work performed
beyond internal metabolism; and (10) unsustainable exploitation of resources.
4.1 Culture
The transmission and accumulation of knowledge, myths, music, laws, and
material possessions (including societal ones) by cultural rather than genetic means
is so prominent in our social species that it sets humans apart from the rest of life. As
noted above, cultural transmission confers adaptability, the ability to respond rapidly
to challenges and opportunities, and above all the accumulation of collective adapta-
tions and resources. All nine other attributes discussed below are intimately connected
to culture. Indisputable as all this is, cultural inheritance neither invalidates the reality
of evolution nor such phenomena as feedback, emergence, competition, and inequality
that characterize life and its interactions with its surroundings.
4.2 Cooperation
All living things are ultimately built of cooperating components, but in no single spe-
cies does cooperation—or mutual help—extend as widely as it does in humans. In
humans, genetically unrelated individuals help one another in ways that often appear
to involve personal sacrifice. Key elements in the evolution and maintenance of this
cooperation among individuals who are not kin include rewards for cooperators, pun-
ishment for those who do not cooperate, and a link between cooperativity and rep-
utation (Milinski et al. 2002; Wilson 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr 2004;
Panchanathan and Boyd 2004; Cassill 2006; Henrich et al. 2006; Nowak 2006; Hauert
et al. 2007). The advantages of belonging to a cohesive, competitively superior group
bound together by patriotism, religion, or a common ethical code outweigh the poten-
tial individual sacrifices (Landa 1976, 1981, 1999); and it is selection among cohesive
groups that strongly favors individual cooperation (Wilson 2002; Wilson and Hölldo-
bler 2005; Cassill 2006).
The establishment of impersonal exchange among strangers is fundamental to the
emergence and success of human-style trading in markets. Institutions such as banks,
patents, formalized and tradable property rights, legal contracts, and a judicial system
of laws and their enforcement provide a measure of economic security for people who
often do not know each other and who may not belong to the same cohesive group.
Such institutions make long-distance trade in large economies possible and reduce the
risks of investment through breach of contract. Greater protection against cheating is
made possible by these arrangements, and enables inventors and entrepreneurs to trans-
form new ideas into marketable goods and services (Landa 1976; Mokyr 1990; Ofek
2001; Seabright 2004). In smaller economies or in certain special cases, a common
code of conduct enforced in a unified, often genetically or linguistically homogeneous
group of middlemen—specialized traders who facilitate exchange between buyer and
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seller—may substitute for the more formal, more impersonal institutions that charac-
terize large modern economies (Landa 1981, 1999). Such a code of conduct, or infor-
mal mutual understanding based on frequent interactions among the same people,
exists among genetically/ethnically homogeneous Chinese merchants in Southeast
Asian societies (Landa 1981, 1999) as well as the Jewish and Italian merchants in Medi-
eval Europe (Landa 2008). Like the formal mechanisms in larger economies, these
arrangements depend on trust, and reduce the risks inherent in exchange between indi-
viduals whose interests do not always coincide. The homogeneous middleman groups
exemplify a high level of cooperation among people operating in economies where
formal law for the protection of property rights and contracts is not well-developed.
Government is the social institution that in advanced human societies makes and
enforces many of the rules that enhance individual and collective economic security.
Although this institution may be unique to humans (Rothschild 1990), dominance
hierarchies (and therefore the dominant male or female) perform analogous functions
in numerous animal species (Corning 2005), and can therefore be said to be a simple
form of government.
In nature, cooperation among unrelated entities is widespread. Recent work in
Uganda shows that, although kinship lays a role in many observed instances of coop-
eration among male chimpanzees, most cooperative acts take place between unrelated
individuals (Langergraber et al. 2007). In species of fish that form schools, unrelated
individuals of the same species that belong to a school both contribute to and benefit
from the antipredator defense and hydrodynamic advantages provided by the group,
and have no incentive to defect (Landa 1998). Cooperation among phylogenetically
distant individuals is known from thousands of examples. Plant and animal cells, for
example, are the product of far-reaching cooperation and integration among compo-
nents—mitochondria, plastids, nucleus, and other structures—whose ancestors were
independent, phylogenetically distant organisms. The symbiosis produced a new, com-
petitively superior whole, much as cooperation and trust in human societies enhance
societal vigor. The controls that regulate multiplication and limit competition among
the parts do not arise from the kinds of deliberate regulation that characterize modern
human societies, but their effects are similar.
4.3 Markets
Many economists and biologists believe that the market, involving the voluntary
exchange of goods and services between strangers, and made possible by formal rules
or informal codes of conduct, is a unique invention of modern humans (Hirshleifer
1977; Tschirhart 2003; Seabright 2004; Mokyr 2006). In Ofek’s (2001,
p. 1) words, ‘The propensity and capacity to exchange one thing for another between
two traders—however unrelated to each other—is a profound distinguishing feature of
human subsistence.’ Unlike nonhuman animals, which hold territory and other posses-
sions transiently, people in advanced economies have developed elaborate systems of
property rights encoded in a welter of laws and rules, which facilitate the trading of
goods and services in the marketplace, often by specialized middlemen, using money
or guaranteed notes as the means of exchange (Landa 1976; Noë and Hammerstein
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1996; de Soto 2000; Bowles and Hammerstein 2003; Pryor 2003). What a buyer is
willing to buy, and a seller is willing to sell, is determined by price, an amount of
money that reflects the information that the parties involved in the trade know or
communicate about supply and demand (Hodgson 2001; Bowles and Hammerstein
2003). At least in theory, this price-setting mechanism works because both supply of,
and demand for, a given commodity are under the complete control of producers and
consumers of that commodity, and because information about supply and demand is
complete as well as reliable. In practice, of course, information is never complete, and
traders with more power disproportionately influence (and often distort) price.
In natural systems, by contrast, exchange is involuntary, middlemen and money are
absent, there are no enforceable contracts, and factors beyond the control of members
of the economy affect supply and demand. In Ofek’s (2001, p. 9) view, ‘Exchange,
or apparent exchange, among living organisms other than humans is largely confined
to the realms of symbiosis and nepotism (i.e., transfers among members of separate
species and transfers among related conspecifics, respectively).’
Two questions emerge. First, are the traits that determine human-economic markets
truly without precedent in nature? Second, are human-economic markets so radically
different that the economic interactions of nature are irrelevant or even misleading for
understanding our economic system? Put differently, do human-economic markets
and other institutions break the laws governing organized nonhuman life, or do they
extend and modify prevailing rules?
The answer to the first question is ‘no.’ Consider the role of enforceable contracts.
Enforcement occurs through a system of punishments and rewards (Henrich et al.
2006). Studies of mutually beneficial relationships in nature reveal that sanctions play
an important role in the origin and maintenance of these cooperative arrangements
between unrelated parties. In the symbiosis between leguminous plants (such as peas)
and the nitrogen-fixing bacteria that invade and occupy nodules on the roots of these
plants, the host plant can deny the bacteria oxygen if the bacteria fail to deliver nitro-
gen to it, resulting in a sharp decrease in the reproductive success of the bacteria
(Kiers et al. 2003). In societies of social insects including some bees and ants, work-
ers are capable of laying eggs but are prevented from doing so by nestmates. This
kind of policing thus reduces selfishness and enforces altruism by the workers toward
the queen (Renseleers and Ratnieks 2006). These sanctions may not look like the
mechanisms operating in the human-economic marketplace of today, but they have
the same effect of facilitating cooperation and trade. Mutualisms are always subject
to dissolution by selfish cheaters, and remain intact only when evolved controls and
regulations are in place (Buss 1987; Thompson and Cunningham 2002). This is as true
in nature as it is in the human realm. Government, enforced taxation (or redistribution
of resources), and other ostensibly uniquely human institutions exist in nature in many
evolved relationships if not by name (see Sect. 5.3 below).
As to the second question—whether human-economic markets break the laws of
organized nonhuman life—I believe the answer is a qualified ‘no.’ By the various
institutions that we have evolved culturally over the centuries, markets have become
ever larger, and trade is carried on by entities that are usually far removed from each
other. This evolution represents an enormous scaling up of economic exchange, and
all but eliminates the ideal for some that individual societies can be self-sufficient.
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But trends toward globalization are not unique to the human economy. With the evo-
lution of highly mobile animals capable of directed, long-distance migrations or of
less directed, passive dispersal, remote ecosystems that would have had no contact
whatsoever became economically joined, often exchanging resources via animal vec-
tors. Birds migrating between northern forests and the tropics, or between the north
and south polar regions, use nutrients obtained in one region to subsidize life in the
other, and vice versa. This kind of mutual subsidy, or long-distance trade, would have
been impossible before warm-blooded birds took to the skies during the Cretaceous
period (Vermeij 2004). Market institutions are, of course, absent in this situation, but
the effects of increasing the magnitude and spatial scale of exchange of resources—of
goods and services—is not so different from the increase in trade that refinements to
market-related economic institutions brought. Markets, money, and middlemen surely
facilitate trade, but they do not fundamentally alter the economic rules that emerged
very early in the history of life.
4.4 Utility
At the heart of economic theory and practice in the human realm is the idea that
humans and their societies develop stable tastes and preferences, which determine
economic decisions. In Becker’s (1976, p. 14) somewhat idealistic conception, ‘all
human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility
from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information
and other inputs in a variety of markets.’ These preferences reflect goals that other
life-forms are thought not to have: health, happiness, affluence, influence, reputation,
and the like. For Mokyr (2006, p. 1011), ‘economies are not like ecologies in that the
main purpose of life seems to be life itself.…There is no real analog in biology to the
economist’s concept of utility.’
Reality is, I think, considerably more nuanced. Rather than indicating a sharp break
between a rich human life of purpose, tastes, and preferences and a poor nonhuman
existence with only survival and reproduction as a basis for meaning, I perceive a
continuum. In the beginning, life was an ‘impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless
little scrap of molecular machinery’ (Dennett 1995, p. 203). With the evolution and
elaboration of nervous systems and social organization, some animal lineages became
increasingly endowed with emergent emotions, meaning, purpose, and intentional
preferences for happiness, wealth, leisure, status, honor, peace, reputation, arousal,
dignity, and pleasure. In our social species, shared culture—music, religion, fashion,
and the pursuit of knowledge—provides the context in which these diverse forms
of utility flourished (Wilson 2002; Mithen 2006). It is true that ‘Emotions and their
expression are at the very centre of human life and thought…’ (Mithen 2006, p. 98); but
emotional states such as happiness, fear, shame, caring for others, desire for mates,
and curiosity—all key elements that enrich mere existence with emergent utility—
are very widespread, especially in mammals (primates, carnivorans, and cetaceans)
and birds (parrots and many songbirds) (de Waal 1996, 2001; Butler and Cotterill
2006). Individual and social values influence what we buy and sell, how we conduct
our lives, and how we interact with others; but conscious preferences do not differ
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fundamentally from the imperatives of survival and reproduction that inform the behav-
ior and economic ‘decisions’ of nonhuman life. In fact, as Corning (2005) points out,
purposiveness (or teleonomy) informs the behavior of many organisms, and can be
traced back very far in evolutionary history. There can be little doubt that humans have
gone further than other species in adding dimensions of want and meaning, largely
arising from our far-reaching sociality, but we are at the end of a continuum, not at
one side of a chasm.
4.5 Intentionality
No attribute of humans has received more attention as the source of our uniqueness
than intentionality, the ability to anticipate, create, and modify outcomes by specific,
directed, action. North (2005, p. viii) puts the case succinctly: ‘In contrast to Darwinian
evolutionary theory, the key to human evolutionary change is the intentionality of the
players.…Human evolution is guided by the perceptions of the players; choices—
decisions—are made in the light of those perceptions with the intent of producing
outcomes downstream that will reduce uncertainty…in pursuit of their goals.’ For
Mokyr (2006, p. 1009), intentionality is all about how we adapt to and modify our
surroundings for our own benefit: ‘human technology is the result of knowledge, that
is, the conscious realization that there are regularities in nature that can be exploited.
No such consciousness exists in nature….’
As with utility, the gulf between intentional, conscious, strategy-forming humans
and automaton-like nonhuman life envisioned by these economists implies a qualita-
tive gap, a conspicuous break from the yoke of our evolutionary past. But is this gap
real, and does it truly represent liberation from the rules of biological adaptation?
I think not. Darwin (1859) chose the breeding of domesticated species by humans
as a good model for selection in the wild even though domestication involves directed,
intentional choices with a particular desired goal in mind, whereas natural selection is
imposed by current agents and agencies without expectations or hopes for the future.
Directed selection is faster than at least some forms of natural selection, and may favor
traits that selection in the wild did not; but natural agents of selection vary hugely in
the pattern of selection they impose and in the traits that their actions cause to be
favored. Over the course of time, the direction of evolution may change as circum-
stances change, whether the lineage is wild or under human domestication. Intentional
behavior permits economic life to become more complex (Arthur 1999); it makes us
adaptively more flexible, increases our rate of cultural adaptation, and allows us to
harness external sources of energy to gain enormous per-capita and collective power
(Vermeij 2004). Utility in the economist’s sense consists of criteria by which we make
decisions and measure our performance. Selective agencies in the wild similarly set
criteria for which adaptations work and which traits do not. Selection remains selec-
tion, regardless of who the agents are, which criteria distinguish success from failure,
or how inclusive the units are among which selection acts (see also Hodgson 2002).
In any case, intentionality may be better developed in humans than in other ani-
mals, but it is not unique to us. Warm-blooded birds and non-human mammals exhibit
a range of conscious, intentional behaviors, indicating that our ability to predict and
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manipulate our surroundings by deliberate action is linked to the repertoires of other
animals by a smoothly graded series of intermediate states of intentionality. Most
important of all, perhaps, is the observation that advanced levels of intentional behav-
ior, such as those seen in parrots, jays, and crows (Butler and Cotterill 2006; Raby
et al. 2007), have evolved in birds, a group of vertebrates that has been phylogenet-
ically separate from the line leading to mammals for some 300 million years. The
independent acquisition of intentional behavior and its material neural basis in several
animal groups testify to the broadly applicable benefits of these powers and to a certain
predictability of their evolution (Vermeij 2006).
4.6 Innovation
Dennett (1995) has suggested that humans innovate in ways that nonhuman biological
systems do not. In his view, human foresight makes possible the design of tools,
machines, buildings, industrial processes, and any number of other material and intel-
lectual innovations. In their construction, these devices need not be functional at every
stage, because these devices are, in effect, exposed to selection only when complete.
Dennett (1995) contrasted human artifacts with organisms, which must be ‘going
concerns’ at every stage of development and during all evolutionary transitions. We
construct things not by trial and error, as the biological processes underlying evolution
do, but by formulating and testing hypotheses. In other words, we employ knowledge
and logic in designing and producing our inanimate infrastructure, which need have
no historical links to any ancestral versions (Dennett 1995; see also Rothschild 1990).
But this kind of human engineering has much in common with combinatorial
innovation in biological development and evolution. Enzymes, structural proteins, bio-
chemical pathways, immune systems, nervous systems, cells, animal and plant bodies,
societies and ecosystems are built of parts—modules, compartments, and circuits—
which through weak connections come together and interact in myriad, flexible ways
according to a few basic rules (Raff 1996; Kirschner and Gerhart 1998, 2005; Carroll
2005). As put succinctly by Kirschner and Gerhart (2005, p. 199), ‘Biology developed
in the direction of linking together simple circuits, rather than making the individual
circuits more complex.’ Through a variety of mechanisms including redundancy of
genes, flexible linkages between parts, and cooption of the same genes for different
functions in different genetic and physiological environments, organisms generate
and accumulate a great deal of exploratory variation, much of it initially protected
from immediate elimination by being nonlethal (Kirschner and Gerhart 1998, 2005).
This exploratory variation, moreover, is not random, nor is it a strictly trial-and-error
sampling of a nearly infinite variety of possibilities. Instead, it comprises states that
slightly modify existing phenotypes in nonlethal ways (Eigen 1992; Kirschner and
Gerhart 1998, 2005).
In short, biological and economic systems have evolved toward an organizational
structure that encompasses, tolerates, generates, and accumulates variation (Kirschner
and Gerhart 1998, 2005). This structure is rendered flexible in that the component
modules interact loosely with other modules while retaining a certain degree of auton-
omy. Not only do systems with such a structure permit innovations to arise and to
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be incorporated, but they become robust in the face of many externally or internally
imposed shocks. For example, Krugman (1996) and Porter (1998) noted that cities or
other ‘economic clusters’ built around enterprises engaged in particular economic pur-
suits become productive, competitive, and innovative when the enterprises are loosely
linked through local relationships in a flexible network. The most robust ecosystems
can tolerate and incorporate new species and adjust to the disappearance of others.
As in the other comparisons I have discussed, the highly derived human-engineering
method of design and construction described by Dennett (1995) and the organization
of cities and economic clusters emphasized by Krugman (1996) and Porter (1998) are
connected to the less intentional systems of biology through intermediate states. Early
hominids emphasized unitary construction when fashioning tools or using voice tones.
Utterances and manufactured objects were therefore independent units rather than
modular in their construction, as is the case in most other animals. Compound tools,
compositional languages and music, and the emergence of symbolic thought appear
to be the hallmarks of modern humans beginning in the Late Paleolithic, perhaps
by 60,000 or 70,000 years ago or even later (Ambrose 2001; Weaver 2005; Mithen
2006). The transition from unitary to compositional cultural entities and artifacts thus
resembles the evolution of nonhuman embryos, societies, and ecosystems. In both the
human and natural realms, combinatorial innovations are more easily generated and
accommodated as the underlying organization becomes more modular, redundant, and
flexible.
4.7 Symbolic thought
As noted above, the use of sounds (and later writing) as representations and symbols
of facts and emotions is a salient distinguishing characteristic of humans. Language
and writing are combinatorial codes that allow individuals to communicate over wide
distances, to transmit complex instructions and observations far into the future, and
above all to create a collective pool of information far exceeding the knowledge that
any single individual can master. At least in principle, individuals can learn from this
accumulated store, and therefore avoid the costly trial-and-error style of learning that
is supposed to characterize nonhuman animals (Castro and Toro 2004).
Given its central role in communication, symbolic thought and language fundamen-
tally reflect our social organization, and may well be responsible for making larger
social groups possible. Music, language, and religion are powerful, socially evolved
means to create bonds among unrelated individuals and to give resulting groups coher-
ence and collective power (Vermeij 2004; Mithen 2006). Writing is, of course, central
to organized economic activity by remote actors (Rothschild 1990; Wilson 2003).
Telecommunication and computers have vastly expanded every aspect of human-eco-
nomic life by extending the reach, reducing the cost, and increasing the quantity of
information.
4.8 Declining birth rate
Another potentially unique human behavior, evident only in some advanced
civilizations, is the voluntary per-capita decline in birth rate (Mokyr 2006). This
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decline, which began in France and the United States during the late eighteenth century
(Cohen 1995), would seem to violate the evolutionary principle that, as the supply of
resources rises, fecundity should increase. In the human case, many factors made the
decline possible or contributed to its spread. These include: (1) a more reliable food
supply, leading both to fewer famines (Cohen 1995; Landes 1998) and more impor-
tantly to an increase in per-capita caloric intake and thus worker output (Fogel 1994);
(2) enhanced sanitation, public health, and disease-fighting medicines, leading to
smaller epidemics and reducing chronic inflammation (Cohen 1995; Landes 1998;
Carey and Judge 2001; Finch and Crimmins 2004); and (3) reduction in poverty
through social spending (Lindert 2004). Social spending in particular reduced the cost
of reproduction for women by broadening the costs and responsibilities of raising
children (Carey and Judge 2001; Penn 2003). Through a series of positive feedbacks
involving rates of reduced rates of juvenile mortality and increased per-capita invest-
ment on children in order to make offspring more competitive, reproductive effort
shifted from high fecundity to lower fecundity coupled with higher survival (Carey
and Judge 2001; Kaplan and Robson 2002). The cost of children forgone was more
than offset by the gain of offspring survival during this fertility transition. Birth control,
imposed from above by governments or embraced voluntarily by individual women,
has further allowed society as a whole to invest more resources in the next generation.
Tradeoffs between survival and fecundity are extremely widespread among organ-
isms. As a result, selection has favored long life and reduced per-capita fertility in
many species besides modern humans (Carey and Judge 2001; Kaplan and Robson
2002). Highly effective protection against predators appears to be a key mechanism for
tilting selection toward greater per-capita investment in offspring. Life in trees (parrots,
early primates), powered flight (bats and birds), and social protection of reproductive
females by worker castes (many social insects) have all been cited as antipredatory
adaptations by metabolically active, long-lived animals with relatively low rates of
production of fertile offspring and high investment in the survival of individual young
(Wilson 1971; Ricklefs 1979; Keller and Genoud 1997; Dudley 2000; Carey and Judge
2001; Kaplan and Robson 2002; Cassill 2006). A parallel development in plants is
discernible when the maternal investment in the endosperm of flowering plants is com-
pared to the near absence of such investment in more ancient groups of land plants
(Westoby and Rice 1982; Bateman and DiMichele 1994).
4.9 Extrasomal extensions
Most of the energy that powers human civilization today does not come from food but
from outside sources that enable us to perform work beyond our internal metabolism.
We use wind, water, Earth’s interior heat, and fuels derived from living plants, animal
dung, fossils, and nuclear reactions. Domesticated animals work for us in agriculture
and transport. No other species or ecosystem comes close to the diversity of energy
sources we harness, or to the per-capita and collective power of our economic activity
(Boyden 1987; Mokyr 1990; Cohen 1995; Marden and Allen 2002). More than any
other living entity, we employ extensions of our bodies—tools, weapons, buildings,
vehicles, foot wear, clothes, roads, ports, dams, reservoirs, farms, factories, cooking
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utensils, computers, and so on—to exert power and control over our surroundings.
This extrasomal expansion, made possible by the eight previously discussed human
capacities, constitutes the material basis for our ecological dominance.
Our unprecedented reliance on extrasomal matter and energy does not, however,
represent a radical departure from what organisms have been doing all along. The har-
vesting of light through photosynthesis may have tripled the energy available to life
during the very early stages of life on Earth (Rosing et al. 2006). Living things have
constructed or used an enormous variety of extensions of their bodies that enhance
nutrition, defense, and reproduction. Examples include soil, burrows, reef frameworks,
nests, beehives, termite mounds, shells, tubes, cocoons, galls, beaver dams, and a wide
variety of ‘domesticated’ organisms. Tool-use by some large-brained birds and pri-
mates, though primitive by our standards, demonstrates that deliberate modification
of devices to perform specific functions evolved multiple times (Butler and Cotterill
2006).
4.10 Unsustainability
Although many economists believe that human-economic growth can be sustained
more or less indefinitely thanks to new resources substituting for depleted ones and to
technological advances fueled by the ‘knowledge economy’, others point out that the
human stamp on Earth’s biosphere has become so large that only the most intrusive
interventions can save us from irreversible collapse. It is not my intention to revisit
the argument for unsustainability that others have made so well (Boyden 1987; Perlin
1989; Penn 2003; Diamond 2005) except to note that unsustainable exploitation of
resources has characterized many human societies beginning as early as 45,000 years
ago, when the first wave of human-caused extinctions devastated the Australian mega-
fauna. Instead, I shall consider the claim (Sterrer 1993) that, within the realm of life,
economic unsustainability is unique to the modern human species.
The overwhelming public perception of the natural world is captured by the phrase
‘balance of nature’; ecosystems are at equilibrium and sustainable in the long run in
the absence of human interference. Forests, mudflats, grasslands, reefs, and a host of
other natural systems do indeed achieve considerable stability and robustness in the
face of disruptions. Resources are recycled and populations are held in check by a
variety of diffusely and unintentionally introduced regulatory mechanisms.
Nevertheless, recycling and retention are not 100% effective. Wardle et al. (2004),
for example, have shown that all six tropical and temperate forest ecosystems they
studied inexorably deplete nutrients from the soils on which the forests depend, with
the result that late-stage vegetations have low productivity and are stunted in appear-
ance. Only when nutrients are replenished by dust, volcanic eruptions, or floods can
forests maintain themselves for time intervals longer than a few decades or centuries.
Nutrient inputs from outside appear to be critical to the long-term maintenance of
many if not most ecosystems, much as trade is essential for the health of the human
economy (see also Polis et al. 1997).
Unsustainable use of resources is thus more evident in the human economy than
in other living systems, thanks to a burgeoning population and rising per-capita
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consumption (Cohen 1995; Penn 2003); but it is not unique to it. This fact does not
absolve us from the responsibility to protect the systems that provide the resources
and services on which we and the rest of the living world depend (Arrow et al. 1995).
In the past, we could import food and fuel from outside sources to support a growing
economy, but we have reached the point where few if any resources remain outside
our economic reach (Wackernagel et al. 2002). This monopoly of the biosphere car-
ries with it all the perils familiar to economists and political scientists who study
concentration of power in business and society.
5 Implications
I have tried to show that all ten differences between human and nonhuman economies
are matters of degree rather than radical departures of humans from the natural order.
Our traits confer unprecedented power and reach; they have accelerated but not fun-
damentally altered trends toward greater power that have characterized life (and
especially its ecologically dominant elements) throughout Earth’s long history. Our
innovations have lifted previous constraints on the number of adaptive pathways avail-
able, on the speed of adaptive response, and on the range of conditions under which
life can thrive, much as evolutionary innovations have done for life in the past.
No matter how advanced our future civilization will become, it will retain prop-
erties that all living systems possess, and it is unlikely to escape entirely from the
constraints inherent in resource-dependent life. Economic policies and visions of the
future must take these realities into account. We cannot eliminate local competition,
voluntarily reduce energy use, avoid resource limitation, or sacrifice redundancy in
favor of economic efficiency.
5.1 Local competition
Despite a globalized economy in which goods, labor, and capital flow more freely
across borders than ever, and in which supply chains span the globe, local compe-
tition remains a vital process. In discussing clusters of businesses engaged in simi-
lar economic pursuits in restricted geographic areas, Porter (1998, p. 78) noted that
‘the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly in local
things—knowledge, relationships, motivation—that distant rivals cannot match.’ He
might have added resources to his list of ‘local things’, but the point remains the same:
competition within and among these geographic clusters of companies engaged in
related fields is local, intense, and necessary for maintaining and enhancing economic
performance, measured in our growth-oriented economy as productivity. Cooperation
among members of clusters, among cities, and among societies may eliminate compe-
tition at one level, but it creates more vigorous competitors at more inclusive levels of
organization and is itself driven by local competition (Vermeij 2004). Moreover, local
competition between potentially dominant entities favors winners whose traits confer
greater power and reach, and losers that either avoid competition or are constrained
to live under conditions where their enemies operate less effectively. Only during
crises in resource availability will the more powerful entities suffer a disadvantage.
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Living systems, including our own, will therefore always have characteristics imposed
by local competition reflecting the activities and performance of their most powerful
members. Schemes to prevent competition are against nature and are doomed to fail
(Vermeij 2004; see also Rothschild 1990).
5.2 Reduced energy use
A common perception of the future is that our reliance on material things and energy
will decline as dependence on information rises. Sterrer (1992), for example, argues
that the accumulation of information about sources and sinks of energy should gener-
ally be favored in evolution over the accumulation of energy itself, because information
is destroyed when its owner dies, whereas energy is transferable and therefore invites
robbery. I agree that adaptive information accumulates in both the human and the
nonhuman realms of life; but accumulation of energy remains important, because
living things need energy to do the work of life and to exert power, which is the crite-
rion by which adaptive and economic performance is measured. In the same vein as
Sterrer’s claim, Ayres (1994, p. 287) asserts that ‘while it operates somewhat errati-
cally, there does seem to be a long-range evolutionary imperative favoring low-energy
and renewable technologies for the future industrial ecosystem, as in the biosphere.’
I agree that more energy will come from renewable sources, and that a clade’s long
geological lifespan is very often associated with a low-energy mode of life; but ecolog-
ically dominant clades are composed of high-energy life-forms, and show no signs of
reduced energy use as long as they retain their positions. A decline in our future use of
energy even as we consolidate our economic dominance and continue to grow would
therefore reverse billions of years of evolution of wave after wave of ecologically elite
forms of life. Human history has thus far not departed from the trend toward rising
energy use (Cohen 1995; Landes 1998; Vermeij 2004). Voluntary reductions in energy
use or power are unknown either in human history (Colinvaux 1980) or the history
of life (Vermeij 2004). When reductions do occur, they are imposed by unforeseen
catastrophes—famines, droughts, wars, mass extinctions, and the like—or by newly
arrived superior competitors.
5.3 Resource limitation
Some economists claim that natural resources no longer limit economic growth.
Instead, technological innovation and institutional adaptability determine the pace
of growth in the modern human economy. Snooks (1998, p. 197), for example, main-
tains that ‘The force constraining the expansion and growth of human society is not
the supply of resources, but the exhaustion of its dynamic strategies and the inability
to replace them with new strategies.’ Rothschild’s (1990) position is similar: ‘Eco-
systems are “resource-limited” networks.—By contrast, an industry’s size is limited
by consumer demand, not the availability of resources’ (Rothschild 1990, p. 214).
Further, he claims (p. 280) that ‘the capitalist system, like the ecosystem itself, spon-
taneously reduces its dependence on scarce and expensive resources.’ Echoing much
recent sentiment among economists and politicians, Rothschild (p. 336) maintains
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that ‘In a world of fixed resources, learning allows the economic pie to keep growing.
Economic growth is limited only by human creativity.’
These claims are founded on erroneous interpretations and uncritical ideology. For
example, Rothschild’s assertion that industry is limited by customers rather than by
resources is at odds with the universally acknowledged importance of investment in
permitting industries to grow. Investment, which is equivalent to energy, is therefore a
limiting resource for industry. Moreover, demand and supply are intimately linked and
cannot be functionally separated. Flowering plants are like industries in depending on
‘customers’ (pollinators in their case), but in order to attract those customers, they
must expend considerable energy in the form of nectar in much the same way that
businesses must expend resources to attract buyers for their goods and services.
Even if industry were limited by demand rather than by supply, as Rothschild and
many others claim, many individuals and groups within society are unambiguously
constrained by scarce financial resources. Yet Rothschild, like other free-market econo-
mists, abhors taxes as a means of redistributing wealth and easing the resource inequal-
ities inherent in a competitive system. By taking money from the rich, so the argument
goes, there is less money available for investment. Moreover—and this is Rothschild’s
main justification—taxes and the governments that levy them are unknown in the econ-
omies of nature.
This justification is again based on a misreading of the facts in the forest and the real-
ities on the reef. Ants defend plants against insects, and pollinators perform services
of cross-fertilization for plants, for a high price, a tax of living space, of nectar, or food
bodies. These taxes may not be levied by a top-down government, but the effect is the
same: a redistribution of resources. Ecosystems and human societies all redistribute
production, and although they vary in the degree to which this is accomplished by dif-
fuse, bottom-up means or concentrated, top-down, government-like entities, the effect
is to allow a greater diversity of economic players to coexist. Resource limitation is by
no means removed by this kind of resource redistribution, but community-wide limi-
tation is diffused among a greater number of individuals much as the risk of financial
catastrophe is spread by the institution of insurance.
It is true that long-term economic growth has occurred in the history of life and in
the human economy thanks to innovations that confer greater power and that permit
the extraction of energy from previously untapped sources (Vermeij 2004). However,
although some depleted resources such as wood and petroleum can be replaced by oth-
ers (Perlin 1989), this option is less available for human food. Production of food has
thus far kept up with human-economic growth both because new foodstuffs have been
added to the diet and because crop yields have increased (Landes 1998), but the rate at
which crop yields are improving in rice and other major staples is declining even with
the application of biotechnology and breeding programs that favor plants with short
stature and large inflorescences (Denison et al. 2003). Cultivated land is being lost to
soil erosion and salinization as well as to industry and urbanization worldwide (Hillel
1991; Wackernagel et al. 2002), and marine resources are being severely overexploited
(Worm et al. 2006). Humans are therefore globally mining biological sources of food
(Wackernagel et al. 2002). Processes by which essential elements are being recycled
and the chemistry of the ocean and atmosphere is maintained are being disrupted,
potentially reducing the biosphere’s productive capacity and other functions on which
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our existence critically depends (Arrow et al. 1995). In other words, it is dangerous and
misleading to assert that finite resources can support a perpetually growing economy.
Finally, I emphasize an important distinction between global scarcity, which affects
population size and economic complexity, and the scarcity that limits individual living
entities. Sunlight is not a limiting resource for the world’s vegetation taken as a whole,
because only about 1% of sunlight is captured by photosynthesis; but when one plant
is shaded by another, light becomes a locally limiting resource. Competition for light
has been a critically important factor in the evolution of plant stature and architecture
(Horn 1971; Vermeij 2004). Thus even if global resource limitation is eased by tech-
nological advances or by government, competitive interactions over locally contested
resources remain fundamental economic determinants for involved parties and their
descendants.
5.4 Economic concentration
One of the foundations of modern economics, the principle of comparative
advantage, is being embraced by free-trade enthusiasts to support a policy of con-
centrating production and other vital economic activities to a few centers dedicated
to those functions. According to this principle, regions that can produce a given com-
modity most cheaply or most efficiently should be those in which that production
is concentrated; subsidies supporting production elsewhere should, according to this
perspective, be abandoned because they distort the market.
Such policies of concentration are both risky and inconsistent with lessons from the
economies of nature. Concentration reduces the safety factor in food production and
ecosystem services. A global catastrophe could engulf society if a regional crop failure,
disease, or war disrupts production in the region of concentration, or if the transport
system on which the global distribution of goods depends suffers a breakdown through
a sudden rise in cost. Officials knowledgeable about trade policy with whom I have
discussed this matter had ignored these perils of concentration in their zeal to purge
the global economy of ‘protectionist’ measures. Biological systems for billions of
years have been characterized by redundancy, which spreads risks and enables sys-
tems of loosely linked but still interdependent parts to absorb and recover from shocks.
Disruptions are inevitable—their history is as old as life itself—but policy-makers can
limit their destructive power by building redundancy into the production and distribu-
tion of goods, even at the cost of reduced efficiency. Redundancy may be at odds with
economic efficiency, but in the long run it is better to have a safety net of redundant
production than to be efficient and dead.
6 Concluding remarks
Comparative economics may appear to be an academic discipline of little practical
consequence, but perceptions about the human economy as being either radically dif-
ferent from or sharing fundamental similarities with the economies of life embody
important assumptions that in turn inform our worldview of the future. Those who
consider civilization as a radical departure from nature follow a long tradition of
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thinking about human-economic progress as a struggle against nature, a conflict that
increasingly frees us from constraints and that allows us to transcend or even violate
the laws of the rest of the biosphere. Those who see the human realm as an extreme
variation on a common theme of life hold that some economic phenomena are univer-
sal, and that violation of the principles underlying these phenomena would be disas-
trous. I clearly belong in this second camp, but I leave the last word to Jacobs (2000,
p. 31): ‘economic development is a matter of using the same universal principles that
the rest of nature uses. The alternative isn’t to develop some other way; some other
way doesn’t exist.’
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